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We present a quantum password checking protocol where secrecy is protected by the laws of
quantum mechanics. The passwords are encoded in quantum systems that can be compared but
have a dimension too small to allow reading the encoded bits. We study the protocol under different
replay attacks and show it is robust even for poorly chosen passwords.
The password checking problem appears when two
sides who share some common information want to verify
the other side also knows it. We consider two parties, Al-
ice and Bob, who share an m-bit string p (the password).
There can also be an eavesdropper, Eve, trying to either
learn the password or to impersonate Alice or Bob. For
simplicity, we describe the case where Alice tries to prove
her identity to Bob. Everything is symmetric for the con-
verse case.
Imagine Alice and Bob can only communicate through
an insecure classical channel. Alice could send her pass-
word in the clear, but Eve could read it undetected and
later pose as Alice. A widespread solution is the use of
hash functions. A hash, or one-way, function H(x) takes
a string x into an output string of a fixed size that ap-
pears to be random. The functionH(x) should be easy to
compute, but difficult to invert. The functions are chosen
so that finding x = H−1(H(x)) from H(x) is computa-
tionally hard. If Alice sends H(p), Eve could still copy
the string and impersonate Alice, but, at least, the pass-
word is protected. If the password has some value, for
instance, Alice uses it in other places, this is a small im-
provement. A greater advantage comes if Alice and Bob
use hash chains. Alice can send a string Hz(p) which
results from applying the hash function z times, first to
p and then to resulting hash of the previous steps. Bob
can keep a record of the zs used in previous identifica-
tion rounds and keep asking for smaller values of z. Eve
can capture Hz(p), but she is not able to produce Hy(p)
for y < z. This is a solution in classical networks [1],
but it is still vulnerable to dictionary attacks in which
Eve compiles a list of the most common passwords and
pre-computes their hashes and the hashes of their hashes
up to a certain depth. If she captures a passing string
Hz(p), she can look it up in her table and find out the
original password [2].
There are password checking protocols, like SPEKE
[3, 4], which are based on Zero Knowledge Proofs [5]
and avoid dictionary attacks from eavesdroppers (but
not for a dishonest side [6]). Similary, the SSH proto-
col favours the use of public key cryptography coupled
with challenge-response authentication. These systems
are based on the computational difficulty of problems
like factoring or the discrete logarithm, which, while ro-
bust against present technology, are not guaranteed to be
hard problems and could, indeed, be broken with quan-
tum computers [7].
In this paper, we propose an alternative password
checking protocol where security is derived from the laws
of quantum mechanics. The protocol can resist replay
attacks and is robust against dictionary attacks, even for
poorly chosen passwords.
Previous quantum solutions to this problem either use
entangled states [8–12] or are built on top of the quantum
key distribution protocol BB84 [13–16]. Our protocol is
instead based on quantum fingerprinting [17]. It encodes
data in a quantum system too small to allow full recov-
ery but which allows state comparison. However, our en-
coding focuses on security rather than in communication
savings. In that respect, it is more similar to quantum
public-key cryptography systems [18–22].
We only need three primitives, quantum state prepara-
tion, random number generation and quantum state com-
parison. Quantum state comparison is performed with
the SWAP test used in quantum fingerprinting. The test
can detect different states. If we have two input states
with density matrices ρ and σ, the test fails and the states
are proved to be different with probability 1−tr(ρσ)2 . If the
states pass the test, with probability 1+tr(ρσ)2 , they can
still be different. If we have many copies of the states, we
can determine whether they are equal or different with
high probability if they are different enough (tr(ρσ) is
not very close to 1).
In our protocol, we apply the SWAP test on pass-
words that are encoded in symmetric states [23] of di-
mension D = 2d. We define symmetric states |Φj〉 with
j = 0, . . . , N − 1 so that
|Φj〉 = 1√
D
D−1∑
l=0
ei
2pijl
N |l〉 . (1)
We take states which encode both the password and
a random bit string ri in a symmetric state
∣∣ψrip 〉 =∣∣ΦH(p||ri)〉 with an index j equal to the integer whose
binary representation is the output of the hash func-
tion H with an input that is the concatenation of the
binary strings representing the password p and the ran-
dom string ri. We work with a hash functionH(x) with n
2bits of output so that there areN = 2n possible password
states that represent the M = 2m possible passwords in
a compressed state space.
A useful property of this encoding is that the mixed
state that comes from choosing at random with the same
probability any symmetric state ρj = |Φj〉 〈Φj | is the
maximally mixed state as
1
N
N−1∑
j=0
ρj =
1
N
1
D
N−1∑
j=0
D−1∑
l=0
D−1∑
m=0
ei
2pij(l−m)
N |l〉 〈m| =
1
D
∑
l,m
1
N
∑
j
(ei
2pi(l−m)
N )j |l〉 〈m| = 1
D
∑
l
|l〉 〈l| = I
D
,
(2)
using that the geometric sum of the ei
2pij(l−m)
N terms is
only different from 0 if l = m, when it is N .
With all these elements we can give the password
checking protocol. We describe the case where Alice
proves her identity to Bob and both share a password p
of m bits that is hashed to produce n bits.
• Repeat up to s times:
1. Alice and Bob generate jointly a random string ri
of m bits.
2. Alice prepares a state
∣∣ψrip 〉 in a quantum system
of a dimension D = 2d with d ≪ n and gives it to
Bob.
3. Bob performs a quantum state comparison between
the received state and a locally generated
∣∣ψrip 〉.
- If the states are found to be different, Bob
aborts the protocol.
- If the states pass the test, we repeat steps 1
to 3 with new random strings ri until we have
s positive comparisons.
For simplicity we choose random strings of m bits, but
any bit number sufficiently larger than n can be used.
Alice and Bob can each generate random strings if they
input orthogonal states into the SWAP test. They have
probability 1/2 of passing the test, which could be identi-
fied with a 1 bit, and probability 1/2 of failing (the bit is
0). The joint random string can be produced by the XOR
of Alice’s and Bob’s strings if they can guarantee the bits
are simultaneously produced. For our purposes, they can
also produce ri taking one bit from Alice and one from
Bob. As long as one of the sides is honest, the hash func-
tion will introduce enough randomization even if only
half the bits of ri are random. For a higher security,
Alice and Bob can use the classical protocol of Damg˚ard
and Luneman, which offers unconditional security for one
side and computational security, even against quantum
computers, for the other side [24]. Alternatively, they
can use the unconditionally secure relativistic coin flip-
ping protocol of Kent [25] or strings whose randomness
is certified by Bell’s theorem [26].
The basic concept of the protocol can be explained
with a simple analogy. We can picture the quantum state
as a piece of paper with a limited size. If we try to write
too many words, at some point we need to sacrifice leg-
ibility. The greater the number of words, the more diffi-
cult it becomes to make sense of what is written. How-
ever, it is still possible to compare two sheets of paper. A
quick glance suffices to tell, with good accuracy, whether
the contents are equal or not. If the contents are almost
equal, there will be a good chance of giving a false posi-
tive, but completely different texts, say a page full of the
letter “a” and one only with numbers, can be told apart
with high confidence.
In this protocol, the password is protected by the lim-
itations of the quantum encoding. We have encoded too
many bits, n, into a too small state space. From the
Holevo bound we know we cannot reliably recover more
than d bits from a D = 2d-dimensional quantum state
[27]. From Nayak’s bound we also know that for d << n,
we also have a small probability of recovering only some
of those bits [28]. We use a stronger result from Ben-
Aroya, Regev and de Wolf [29] which limits k-out-of-n
encodings that allow to recover k bits from the total n
bits of a string. If d
n
< 12 ln 2 ≈ 0.72, the probability of
recovering k bits is exponentially small in k. For a small
enough d
n
, the probability tends to 2−k, which is as likely
as guessing the bits by chance.
If we choose sd ≪ n, Eve would not learn anything
from the password, even if she captured all the states in
a full protocol exchange. Usually, Alice and Bob must
both identify to the other side. In those cases, instead
of first performing the s stages of Alice authenticating to
Bob and the s stages of Bob convincing Alice, they should
take turns for each stage. If Eve is on any of the sides,
she would be detected early, before she can capture many
states. The number of generated states before changing
the password must be established so that the maximum
captured states c still satisfies cd≪ n.
The k-out-of-n bound also limits the amount of global
information an attacker can learn from the password
state. The useful information about any k bits ofH(p||ri)
must be, at most, exponentially small in k. Otherwise,
Alice and Bob could devise a code that groups the states
with the different values of a global property, such as the
parity of all the bits or the AND function of a group of
them, and use the attack as a way to send one bit of in-
formation with a probability better than the limit close
to 0.5 given by the bound.
If we haveM possible combinations of parameters, the
average probability of passing the SWAP test is related
to the average fidelity F¯ of all the fidelities Fk = tr(ρtρk)
between the trial state ρt of an attacker who does not
know p and the legitimate pure state ρk which depends
3on the considered parameters. We have,
P¯ =
1
M
M−1∑
k=0
1 + Fk
2
=
1 + 1
M
∑
k Fk
2
=
1 + F¯
2
. (3)
In the rest of the paper we show an attacker who doesn’t
know anything about p can only produce states with an
average fidelity F¯ = 1
D
. If D is high enough, the proba-
bility of passing the s stages of the protocol and fooling
Bob into accepting a false Alice is(
1
2
+
1
2D
)s
≈ 2−s + 2−s s
D
, (4)
which can be made arbitrarily small.
There are two main attacks we must avoid. The first
is a random state attack. We can consider Eve in-
tends to fool Bob with a trial state ρt that is constant
for all attempts. She will try to maximize her probabil-
ity of passing the test for all the possible passwords. The
average fidelity for this trial state is
F¯ =
1
M
M−1∑
p=0
tr(ρtρ
ri
p ) = tr
(
ρt
1
M
M−1∑
p=0
ρrip
)
(5)
for the constant, known ri of each stage. When we con-
sider all the possible fixed ri, the value of an ideal hash
function H(p||ri) is evenly distributed through all the
integers from 0 to N − 1 with the different values of p.
When the number of the hash output bits n is sufficiently
smaller than the number of the password bits m, the
sum gives a uniform average on all the possible symmet-
ric states and the result is close to the completely mixed
state of Equation (2). The average fidelity can then be
approximated by
F¯ = tr
(
ρt
I
D
)
=
1
D
tr(ρt) =
1
D
(6)
if ρt is pure, or smaller for mixed trial states. Essentially,
p randomizes the state. The attacker sees a maximally
mixed state and cannot do better than random guessing.
There is a second important family of attacks. Eve can
try a replay attack in which she captures and stores
previous legitimate interchanges between Alice and Bob
and uses the captured states to impersonate Alice. The
random strings ri prevent Eve from directly using her
stored states, but she can try to modify them to fool
Bob.
The simplest case is one in which Eve captures a state
ρr1p and wants to produce a state as close to the next
state in the protocol ρr2p as possible. Eve can perform
any allowed operation on the captured state. The most
general transformation allowed by quantum mechanics is
a completely positive map E(ρr1p ) = trE(U(ρr1p ⊗ρanc)U †)
which combines the effects of adding an ancillary system
ρanc, performing a unitary operation U in the larger state
space of ρr1p ⊗ ρanc and then presenting Bob with a sub-
system of the resulting state, represented by the partial
trace trE [30]. Eve wants to maximize her fidelity
F¯ =
1
M3
M−1∑
p=0
M−1∑
r1=0
M−1∑
r2=0
tr(E(ρr1p )ρr2p ) (7)
for any combination of p, r1 and r2.
We use a result by Fiura´sˇek to bound this fidelity [31].
For input states |ψin(~x)〉 chosen from a set of parameters
~x, the best approximation to outputs |ψout(~x)〉 is given
by the average fidelity
F¯ =
∫
〈ψout(~x)| E(|ψin(~x)〉 〈ψin(~x)|) |ψout(~x)〉 d~x, (8)
which can be optimized using Lagrange multipliers. For
our discrete version of the average fidelity shown in Equa-
tion (7), we need to look at operator
Rˆ =
1
M3
M−1∑
p=0
M−1∑
r1=0
M−1∑
r2=0
(ρr1p ⊗ ρr2p ). (9)
For any fixed p, the sum in r1 and r2 has outputsH(p||r1)
and H(p||r2) in all the values of 0 to N−1 and Equation
(2) is a good approximation to the final state so that
Rˆ =
1
M2
∑
p
∑
r1
(
ρr1p ⊗
I
D
)
=
1
M
∑
p
(
I
D
⊗ I
D
)
=
I
D2
.
(10)
Fidelity F¯ is bounded by the dimension of the input
Hilbert space dimH and the largest eigenvalue Rmax of
Rˆ [31]. In our case, I
D2
has eigenvalues 1
D2
and
F¯ ≤ dimHRmax = D 1
D2
=
1
D
. (11)
We can extend the results to the case where Eve captures
up to c states ρr1p , ρ
r2
p , . . . , ρ
rc
p and wants to approximate
the next state in the sequence ρc+1p . Now
F¯ =
1
M c+2
∑
p,r1,...,rc,rc+1
tr(E(ρr1p ⊗ ρr2p ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρrcp )ρrc+1p )
(12)
and
Rˆ =
1
M c+2
∑
p,r1,...,rc,rc+1
(ρr1p ⊗ρr2p ⊗· · ·⊗ρrcp ⊗ρrc+1p ). (13)
We can proceed in a way similar to the single captured
state scenario and show
Rˆ =
I
Dc+1
(14)
and
F¯ ≤ dimH⊗cRmax = Dc 1
Dc+1
=
1
D
. (15)
4There are two caveats. First, the bound breaks down af-
ter a number of captured states. We assume Eve doesn’t
know a single bit of p. If she did, the average of Equation
(12) is not the quantity to maximize and the proof is no
longer valid. The bound holds as long as cd≪ n so that
Eve cannot guess the bits from p. We already keep this
bound in order to protect the password.
There might be insecure particular cases, but, for
random ris, they must be rare on average. After s
stages, the probability of fooling the system still tends
to 2−s + 2−s s
D
. Bob can also keep a list of all the previ-
ously used ris to avoid repetition or weak special cases.
These bounds show the protocol is resistant to eaves-
droppers that try to learn the password or perform a
replay attack. The protocol offers and additional layer of
security beyond that of systems based on computational
complexity. Security is based on physical limitations.
The protocol protects against adversaries with a quan-
tum computer and is independent of technological as-
sumptions. A hash H(x) which is difficult to invert with
present technology could be broken with better comput-
ers. This has happened with algorithms like MD5 [32].
Similarly, the systems that use public key cryptography
are usually optimized for speed and could be broken with
better computers. In our protocol, if we choose a small
enough dimension D, the password is unreadable even
for future technologies.
Using quantum systems also gives additional protec-
tion from dictionary attacks. If we choose a bad pass-
word b from a reduced set of possible passwords of size B
so that D ≪ B < 2m, Eve still cannot look up the cap-
tured states in a pre-computed table. If she could find
the password, she would have an encoding that allowed
to squeeze more than d bits into a D-dimensional state.
A bad password choice would not reduce the security
of the system as long as B is sufficiently larger than N .
If we suspect passwords are chosen from a smaller set,
like a small dictionary of English words, our proofs are
no longer valid and there could exist advanced imperson-
ation attacks. If passwords are chosen freely, it could be
safer to send a hash q = H ′(b) that takes the passwords
into a string with a smaller size n′ which is small enough
to make bad passwords produce randomly distributed q
strings and, at the same time, is large enough to make
cd ≪ n′. This reduces the number of password reuses,
but preserves the properties of the original scheme.
The protocol has been given in a general form with
three simple primitives that do not require a full quantum
computer. A practical realization of the protocol can be
deployed on top of existing systems as an additional mea-
sure of security. There is a relatively simple implemen-
tation with optical primitives where state preparation is
feasible and the SWAP test can be performed with the
Hong-Ou-Mandel effect [33, 34]. A detailed implementa-
tion will be presented elsewhere.
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